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The Failure of East German Antifascism:  
Some Ironies of History as Politics [1991] 
Konrad H. Jarausch  
Abstract: »Das Versagen des Antifaschismus: Zur Ironie von Geschichte als 
Politik in der DDR«. The overthrow of Communism through the “peaceful 
revolution” during 1989/90 raised the question of what to do with its ideologi-
cal justification of “anti-fascism.” Ironically some self-critical GDR intellec-
tuals like Christa Wolf had already argued that what had begun as a rigorous 
effort to repudiate National Socialism had turned into a legitimation of a new 
SED-dictatorship. Written during the exciting process of German unification, 
this essay attempted a preliminary assessment of the role of East German histo-
rians within the SED-regime: On the one hand their scholarly efforts had be-
come more complex and convincing during the 1980s, leading to growing re-
cognition from abroad. But on the other hand, these scholars also showed a 
failure of political nerve by not drawing the practical consequences from their 
empirical and methodological advances. Based on discussions with East Ger-
man colleagues, this essay sought to resolve the paradox of their intellectual 
contribution and political inaction. 
Keywords: peaceful revolution, anti-fascism, GDR intellectuals, East German 
historians, SED dictatorship. 
 
In overturning the SED regime, the civic revolutionaries of 1989 also repu-
diated the GDR’s conception history. Restive writers like Helga Königsdorf 
warned that “the abuse of an imposed anti-Fascism” had ultimately “threatened 
to produce a new Fascism.” But other intellectuals like Rudolf Frey continued 
to cling to their Communist beliefs: “In our country, this anti-Fascism has 
contributed to eradicating the roots of the brown plague and to barring the rise 
of neo-Fascism, a few exceptions notwithstanding.”1 In East Germany’s ideo-
logized discourse, such debates about fascism were never just about the past 
but also about the present. As one of the first to expose Nazi collaboration in 
Kindheitsmuster, the novelist Christa Wolf warned that public indoctrination 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Jarausch, Konrad H. 1991. The Failure of East German Anti-Fascism: Some 
Ironies of History as Politics. German Studies Review 14: 85-102.  
 The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) has generously supported the 
GDR-US subcommission on history. For material and suggestions, I would like to thank 
Werner Bramke, Elisabeth Domansky, Georg G. Iggers, Gerald R. Kleinfeld, Wolfgang 
Küttler, Christiane Lemke, David Pike, and Vincent von Wroblewsky. Drafted in January 
1990, and revised until November 1990, this essay is a first attempt to reflect on the role of 
historical scholarship in the collapse of the GDR. 
1  Helga Königsdorf, “Der Partei eine Chance geben,” Neues Deutschland, 22 November 
1989; and Rudolf Frey‘s letter to the editor, ibid., 6 December 1989. 
 213 
with a certain view of history by “a small group of anti-Fascists which ruled the 
country” had nefarious consequences. These “’victors of history’ ceased to 
engage their real past as collaborators, dupes or believers during the Nazi pe-
riod.” Their silence, based on a bad conscience, “made them unsuitable for 
resisting Stalinist structures and patterns of thought, which for a long time were 
deemed a touchstone of ‘partisanship’ and ‘loyalty.’”2 In supreme irony, critics 
argued that the proud antifascist legacy helped legitimize a new kind of unfree-
dom in the GDR.  
As the guardians of the moral flame, East German historians of the Third 
Reich played a special but problematic role. In their public statements, they 
upheld antifascism as a non-communist justification for the independence of 
the GDR and as cement for the progressive consensus, ranging from proletarian 
underground to bourgeois resistance. In their academic research they sought to 
uncover the economic and political mechanisms behind the Nazi dictatorship so 
as to prevent its recurrence. However, these related efforts were hampered by a 
narrow ideological definition of National Socialism as fascism, characterized as 
state monopoly capitalism. According to the representative eight-volume histo-
ry of the German labor movement of the 1960s, the NSDAP was “the party 
which best represented the class interests of the most reactionary groups of 
German finance capital and other backward circles.” National Socialism was 
the logical outcome of the crisis of capitalist monopolies that pushed German 
imperialism into war in order “to break the power of the working class and the 
KPD more effectively.”3 Since it clearly identified the class enemy while ab-
solving the majority of the population of Nazi complicity, the Comintern con-
cept of fascism proved to be a captivating slogan for political struggle. But 
unceasing repetition could not make stamokap formulas into subtle academic 
analysis, while their inherent oversimplification gradually eroded their ethical 
force.  
Opposed to the political uses of antifascism, western scholars were slow to 
shift from anticommunist polemics to serious analysis of East German contri-
butions. The growing maturation of GDR research began to attract the attention 
of West German specialists only in the late 1970s. In his Erlangen dissertation, 
Günter Heydemann stressed SED direction of research, but also traced the 
increasing methodological sophistication and topical differentiation of GDR 
                                                             
2  Christa Wolf, Kindheitsmuster (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1976); and “Das haben wir nicht 
gelernt,” Wochenpost, No. 43, reprinted in taz, ed., DDR Journal zur Novemberrevolution 
(Berlin: taz, 1989), 21f. 
3  Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus, ed., Vom Januar 1933 bis Mai 1945, vol. 5 of Ge-
schichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1966), 9ff. For western 
theories of fascism as the overarching concept of various radical right-wing movements see 
Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism: A Reader’s Guide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976). 
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scholarship.4 In the United States, the emigre Andreas Dorpalen compiled a 
comprehensive and “critical, although by no means hostile, assessment of GDR 
interpretations in terms of international scholarship.” Published after his death 
in 1985, this massive volume interrogated the uniform and stable Geschichts-
bild presented by East German historians from a radical democratic perspec-
tive.5 Interested in social history and methodological innovation, the historio-
graphy specialist Georg G. Iggers presented a more positive reading of East 
German accomplishments in several essays. In order to make its achievements 
known, he prepared an anthology on GDR social history “not primarily as 
examples of Marxist historiography but as new approaches which deserve 
attention abroad.”6 In contrast, the bulk of western historians generally ignored 
East German scholarship, clinging to outdated preconceptions that no longer 
corresponded to the increasing differentiation of Marxist historiography.7  
The fall of bureaucratic socialism threw antifascist scholarship into an ideo-
logical and institutional crisis. Fixated upon the Nazi menace in the past, most 
GDR historians failed to criticize the threat of Erich Honecker’s police state in 
the present.8 Since totalitarianism theory smacked of crude Cold War polemics, 
they only rarely recognized the symptomatic resemblance of brown and red 
repression and were reluctant to transfer their anti-Hitler commitment into anti-
Stalinist protest.9 With journalists taking the lead in exposing the dirty secrets 
in the GDR’s past, historians as former collaborators lost public credibility.10 
                                                             
4  Günter Heydemann, Geschichtswissenschaft im geteilten Deutschland, Entwicklungs-
geschichte, Organisationsstruktur, Funktionen, Theorie- und Methodenprobleme in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in der DDR (Frankfurt: Lang, 1980), 171ff. 
5  Andreas Dorpalen, German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985), with an introductory essay by Georg G. Ig-
gers and bibliographic appendixes by Evan Bukey, 11ff. 
6  Iggers, “Einige Aspekte neuer Arbeiten in der DDR über die neuere Deutsche Geschichte,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 14 (1988): 542ff; and “Introduction,” to the volume on Social 
History in the GDR (New York: Berg Publishers, 1991). 
7  George Verbeeck, “Kontinuität und Wandel im DDR-Geschichtsbild,” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, B11/90, 9 March 1990, 30-42. For discouraging examples see the cursory 
comments of Dietrich Staritz, “Zur Geschichte der DDR,” and Rudolf Vierhaus, “Ge-
schichtsbewusstsein Deutschland,” in Werner Weidenfeld, ed., Deutschland-Handbuch. 
Eine doppelte Bilanz, 1949-1989 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1989), 69ff 
and 86ff. 
8  For first English language narratives cf. T.G. Ash, The Magic Lantern (New York: Random 
House, 1990), and Elizabeth Pond, After the Wall (New York, 1990). 
9  See the autobiographical reflection by Vincent von Wroblewsky, “Die Lüge zur Weltord-
nung gemacht...” Temps modernes, spring 1990; and Ulf Kalkreuth interview with Werner 
Bramke, “Widerstand gegen die Widerständler,” UZ: Universitätszeitung ... Karl Marx 
Universität, 1 December 1989. 
10  Hermann Weber, “Die DDR – ‘Geschichtswissenschaft im Umbruch?’ Aufgaben der 
Historiker bei der Bewältigung der stalinistischen Vergangenheit,” Deutschland-Archiv, 
summer 1990. The last SED-PDS attempt to raise the neofascist specter as a rallying cry 
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Just when the removal of political control created opportunities for democratic 
departures, the renewal of the tainted discipline was threatened by fiscal con-
straints. Resentment of former victims and envy of some western colleagues 
endangered the survival of history’s institutional bases and research privileg-
es.11 In this perilous transition, outside observers can provide perspective by 
raising some crucial questions: How did GDR scholarship evolve in the half-
century after Hitler’s fall? What are the peculiar strengths and weaknesses of 
the Marxist view of fascism? Which political tendencies does the development 
of East German historiography of the Third Reich mirror? What are the lessons 
of a truncated antifascism for the reconstruction of the historical discipline? 
A promising starting point for an analysis of GDR writing on fascism is the 
self-representation of East German scholars, presented in their papers at the 
1987 and 1989 IREX conferences.12 While emphases differ somewhat among 
authors, there is general agreement on periodization, such as the existence of an 
initial antifascist phase after the collapse of the Third Reich. With liberation by 
the Red Army, survivors of the resistance and anti-Nazi intellectuals in the East 
embarked on a political crusade to wean the population from Hitler’s influence. 
Based on personal testimony as well as public commemoration, this antifascist 
consensus cut across class divisions and ideological lines and was remarkably 
successful in changing public rhetoric. Initial explanations of the catastrophe 
stressed German responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War, the 
societal roots of fascist imperialism in the greed of the ruling classes as well as 
the ideological dynamics of antibolshevism and anti-Semitism. To justify radi-
cal domestic change, communist politicians like Walter Ulbricht castigated the 
alliance of the former elites such as Junkers and generals with the Nazis.13 With 
the rise of the SED dictatorship, the spectrum of opinion narrowed, and scho-
lars considered as bourgeois voices were increasingly purged from the histori-
cal profession. While antifascism was central to the self-definition of the 
                                                                                                                                
failed when the violation of the Soviet Treptow memorial was attributed to the infamous 
secret police (Stasi). 
11  Harm Klueting, “Parteilichkeit war wichtiger als Objektivität,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 17 March 1990; and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Hilfe statt Beckmesserei: Die deut-
schen Historiker zur Lage der Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR,” ibid., 13 July 1990. Cf. 
also Wolfgang Küttler et al., “Antwort auf die Fragen an die außeruniversitären For-
schungseinrichtungen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” (MS, Berlin, 1990). 
12  For typical self-descriptions see Rolf Richter‘s paper on “Der deutsche Faschismus – 
Ergebnisse und Probleme seiner Erforschung,” at the November 1987 IREX conference, as 
well as his essay “Faschistischer Terror und antifaschistischer Widerstand in der Historio-
graphie der DDR,” in Kurt Pätzold, ed., Deutscher Faschismus – Terror und Widerstand 
(Berlin: Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, 1989). Cf. Joachim 
Lehmann, “Views of Fascism in the GDR,” lecture at the University of North Carolina, 17 
October 1989. 
13  Walter Ulbricht, Der faschistische deutsche Imperialismus (1933-1945) (Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1956), 3rd ed. of Die Legende vom deutschen Sozialismus, (1945). 
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emerging GDR, it was instrumentalized from the start to justify the rule of the 
new communist elite. Pedagogical rather than scholarly, these early efforts 
were focused on “remembering, collecting, preserving, transmitting, repre-
senting and enlightening.”14  
Propelled by the ideological hostility of the Cold War, the second phase of 
antifascist historiography centered on refining the theory of state-monopoly-
capitalism. The 1935 Comintern definition called fascism “the overt terrorist 
domination of the most reactionary, the most chauvinistic, and the most impe-
rialistic elements of German finance capital.” According to GDR historians, the 
crisis of capitalism leads to monopolistic forms of production, the collapse of 
which eventually produces revolution. Hitler’s charisma and the NSDAP’s 
mass following were only the popular instruments of the ruling circles in their 
desire for the suppression of the revolutionary labor movement through impe-
rialist aggrandizement. Relativizing the specificity of the Nazi phenomenon by 
embedding it in a critique of capitalism made antifascism an ideological wea-
pon against bourgeois remnants within and neofascist dangers from without.15 
This view posed fruitful questions about  
the relationship between economics and politics in a Fascist dictatorship, the 
completion of state-monopoly capitalism, the specific role of Fascist state 
power, the character and function of Fascist movements, of neo-Fascism and 
last but not least the anti-Fascist resistance struggle. 
But the apodictic primacy of economics tended to deny the Nazi political 
movement any independence and interpreted Hitler’s actions as executing the 
demands of monopolists, even when evidence suggests an opposite relation-
ship. During the 1950s GDR production was dedicated to an ideological cri-
tique of “bourgeois” conceptions and to efforts at laying the foundations for 
research in source collections and syntheses.16  
With the ideological underpinnings in place, East German historians created 
a new disciplinary infrastructure during the 1960s. For the sake of publication 
in the party-controlled media such as the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissen-
schaft, scholars had to base their conclusions on the perspective of “historical 
materialism.” Seemingly unaware of any contradiction, GDR historiography 
                                                             
14  Richter, “On Some Aspects of Recent Historiography in the GDR About Fascist Terror and 
Anti-Fascism” paper at the 1989 IREX conference. Cf. also Christina von Buxhoeveden, 
Geschichtswissenschaft und Politik in der DDR. Das Problem der Periodisierung (Colo-
gne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1980), 229ff. 
15  Pierre Aycoberry, The Nazi Question: An Essay on the Interpretations of National 
Socialism, 1922-1975 (New York: Panther Books, 1981), 119ff, 125ff. For the breakup of 
the unified German historical profession see Winfried Schulze, Deutsche Geschichtswissen-
schaft nach 1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989), 183ff. 
16  See the polemical self-justification of Gerhard Lozek, “Faschismus,” in Lozek, et al., eds., 
Kritik der bürgerlichen Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt: Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 
1980), 4th rev. ed. This volume was first published in 1970 as Unbewältigte Vergangenheit, 
but still breathes the spirit of the Cold War. Cf. Dorpalen, German History, 393ff. 
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was unabashedly partisan, dedicated to objective science in the service of the 
proletariat rather than to subjective relativism. Eventually the few older Marx-
ists trained a new generation of GDR historians which achieved such a mono-
poly over the discipline that they could dispense with bourgeois remnants and 
Socialist dissidents. The institutional center of scholarship shifted from the six 
East German universities to the Academy of Sciences, and the SED expanded 
its own research establishments in the party academy and the Institute for 
Marxism-Leninism. As part of the planned economy, historical efforts were 
directed towards particular priorities, initially by the party and later by a thirty-
two-member commission of scholars.17 In contrast to western individualism, 
GDR research remained a collective enterprise, aimed at the production of 
authoritative textbooks on the First World War or the Third Reich in the multi-
volume Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte. Since access to western archives 
required scarce valuta, GDR historians concentrated on mining the domestic 
records of the Central German Archives in Potsdam or the Prussian papers at 
Merseburg. Combining orthodoxy with greater factual detail, their voices be-
gan to be heard at international conferences and their monographic contribu-
tions started to approach western professional standards.18  
During the later 1970s, the emphasis of Marxist scholarship shifted from ex-
tolling the antifascist tradition to a broader appreciation of the German herit-
age. Enshrined in the Museum of German History in the Zeughaus in East 
Berlin, the initial GDR approach had focused on fashioning a progressive pedi-
gree, beginning with the Peasants’ War, skipping to the revolution of 1848, 
fastening upon the rise of the labor movement, and culminating in the founda-
tion of the Communist Party (KPD).19 Whatever did not belong to this forward-
looking tradition was denounced as reactionary, in a conscious attempt at 
claiming everything democratic for the East and associating everything reac-
tionary with the West. With growing self-assurance, a wider recognition of the 
German heritage emerged, willing to acknowledge the problematic legacies of 
the Reformation, Prussia, and unification in their entirety.20 Somewhat to the 
chagrin of orthodox communists, this Erbe und Tradition view produced wide-
ranging biographies of controversial individuals such as Martin Luther, Frede-
                                                             
17  Iggers, “Introduction,” passim; and Dorpalen, German History, 23ff. 
18  See for instance, Fritz Klein et al., Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1968), 3 vols.; and E. Paterna et al., Deutschland von 1933 bis 1939 (Berlin: Deut-
scher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1969), the Third Reich volume in Lehrbuch der Deut-
schen Geschichte. The latter still interprets the Third Reich as a creature of finance capital. 
See pp. 47-53, 348f. 
19  Wolfgang Herbst and Kurt Wernicke, Museum für Deutsche Geschichte (Berlin: Berlin 
Information, 1987), 3d rev. ed. 
20  Richter, “Some Aspects of Recent Historiography,” 4f. Cf. Küttler and Hans Schleier, “Die 
Erbe-Konzeption und der Platz preussischer Geschichte in der DDR-Geschichts-
wissenschaft,” German Studies Review 6 (1983): 535-58; and Walter Schmidt, “Erbe und 
Tradition in der Diskussion der DDR-Historiker” (MS, Berlin, 1988). 
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rick the Great, or Otto von Bismarck.21 At the same time, the methodological 
approaches of East German historians slowly broadened to include social histo-
ry. Tired of abstract generalization about class conflict, younger people wanted 
to find out concrete details about everyday lives of their parents and raised 
questions about their complicity with Nazi rule. Spurred by economic histo-
rians and ethnologists, Third Reich specialists began to elaborate a more com-
prehensive picture of the fascist experience.22 Due to a broadened definition of 
antifascism, such previously neglected topics as the bourgeois resistance and 
the persecution of Jews slowly began to come into view.23  
A largely self-inflicted stereotype, prevalent in the West, renders an assess-
ment of the accomplishments of antifascist historiography difficult. The ideo-
logical partisanship of East German authors made it appear as if the role of 
research were confirmatory, illustrating preconceptions rather than challenging 
them. The public pedagogical stance of GDR colleagues in building socialist 
consciousness sometimes seemed to produce statements verging on outright 
propaganda.24 The economic determinism of many Marxist writings, e.g., re-
garding industrial support for Hitler’s seizure of power, also occasionally out-
ran actual documentation.25 The facelessness of collective production tended to 
obscure the contribution of individual scholarly discovery and responsibility. 
The formulaic nature of many generalizations produced a colorless tone and 
detracted from more differentiated detail analyses. Finally, the suppression of 
internal debates in print and the presentation of a uniform front to the outside 
made for an impression of grey uniformity and stability. Ritualized references 
to the “principles of historical materialism” reinforced negative preconceptions 
among non-Marxists – much to the chagrin of GDR historians who felt belittled 
and misunderstood. For the sake of a dispassionate judgment, western analyses 
of East German conceptions of fascism need to transcend such surface appear-
                                                             
21  Ernst Engelberg, Bismarck. Urpreuße und Reichsgründer (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1985), xiv, 
set out “to show the tendencies of historical laws in the actions of men of flesh and blood, with 
their weaknesses and strengths, even their contradictions, multifaceted like life itself.” For an 
earlier effort cf. Willibald Gutsche, Aufstieg und Fall eines kaiserlichen Reichskanzlers. Theo-
bald von Bethmann Hollweg, 1856-1921 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1973). 
22  Richter, “Some Aspects of Recent Historiography,” 3ff ; Iggers, “Introduction,” 25ff. 
23  Richter, “Faschistischer Terror,” 17ff; Bramke, “Carl Goerdeler: Dealing with a 
Controversial Resistance Fighter,” paper at the 1989 IREX conference; and Pätzold, Ver-
folgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung. Dokumente des faschistischen Antisemitimus 1933 bis 
1942 (Leipzig: Reclam, 1984) was the first paperback on the holocaust in the GDR. 
24  Waltrand Falk, “Vorwort,” to “Nie Wieder Faschismus und Krieg! Die Mahnung der fa-
schistischen Bücherverbrennung am 10. Mai 1933,” Berichte der Gesellschaftwissen-
schaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt Universität, 1983, No. 5, 3ff. 
25  Debate between Henry A. Turner and Kurt Gossweiler at the 1987 IREX conference, based 
upon their writings on German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (NewYork: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1985), versus Grossbanken, Industriemonopole, Staat. Ökonomie und Politik 
des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus in Deutschland 1914-1932 (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 1971). See also Dorpalen, German History, 46ff. 
 219 
ances and delve more deeply into the strengths and weaknesses of the actual 
historical writing which is surprisingly unknown in the outside world.  
In highlighting areas of particular concern, GDR scholars created a some-
what stylized picture of the Third Reich. Shifting attention away from Hitler’s 
charisma, they saw Nazi rule as the triumph of industrial and financial capital-
ists, representing “a new form of social and state-monopolist holding organiza-
tion of the entire ruling system.” In the countryside, NS propaganda and terror 
combined to suppress the rural proletariat, but economic forces undercut rea-
grarianization through the flight of laborers. In the cities, “the economic policy 
of the NS-regime aimed at the coordination of all forces for the preparation of 
an imperialist war, which was to secure Germany’s predominance in Europe 
and in the world.”26 In discussions of the resistance, “scholarly interest focused 
on the anti-Fascists and their mainstay, the minority of the proletariat which 
made no concessions to Fascism” rather than on the effects of demagoguery 
and terror on the working class. The outbreak of the war was attributed to the 
aggressive designs of the monopoly capitalists in Germany and the West, gloss-
ing over Stalin’s maneuvering.27 The initial victories of the Wehrmacht were 
interpreted as the realization of German imperialist plans with much attention 
to the economic despoliation of the vanquished. The strategic discussion fo-
cused on the battle with the Soviet Union, in which the first socialist state 
proved victorious as a superior social system even after the desperate NS esca-
lation to total war. GDR historians have produced a dialectical image of the 
fascist experience with the monopoly-controlled Nazi terror resisted by heroic 
Communists.28  
According to most western specialists, this image is seriously incomplete. 
Axiomatic assertions that the Nazi party was the executive organ of the bour-
geoisie have been difficult to document. Anglo-American scholars claim that 
the widespread mass support of the Nazis was not just a result of manipulation 
but also a genuine expression of the political feelings of the “masses,” be they 
petit bourgeois or proletarian. Important intermediary groups such as profes-
sionals simply fall through the grid of Marxist class analysis – a somewhat 
surprising neglect, since historians themselves might be considered part of this 
                                                             
26  See papers by Manfred Weissbecker, “Faschistische Organisationen in Deutschland und 
ihre Bedeutung für das Herrschaftssystem”; Joachim Lehmann, “Der ‘bodenständige Land-
arbeiter.’ Zielstellung und Ergebnis Faschistischer Landarbeiterpolitik in Deutschland 1933 
bis 1939”; and Bramke, “Veränderungen in der Wirtschafts- und Sozialstruktur Sachsens, 
1933-1945. Zum Problem von Regionalismus und Zentralismus während der faschistischen 
Herrschaft in Deutschland,” all at the 1987 US-GDR colloquium. 
27  Pätzold, “Arbeiterklasse und Faschismus in Deutschland, 1933-1939,” paper at the 1987 
US-GDR colloquium and public lecture on the outbreak of the Second World War in Prin-
ceton, May 1989. 
28  Paterna et al., Deutsche Geschichte, passim; and Dorpalen, German History, 399-464. Cf. 
also the multivolume set on Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg. 
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stratum!29 Western scholars agree that the resistance was not just a communist 
monopoly, but rather a broader social process of daily non-compliance, involv-
ing the churches, the generals, and old elites. In contrast to reluctant GDR 
references to the persecution of the Jews as result of material envy and mass 
manipulation, the holocaust raises troubling general questions, since it demon-
strates that race hatred can supercede class struggle. The SS terror system re-
quired considerable mass collaboration in denunciations, since Nazi leaders 
preferred voluntary support when they could generate it.30 In countless particu-
lar cases western scholars have been able to point out that the ideologized 
Marxist conception oversimplifies crucial contradictions of the German past.  
While rejecting outside criticism, GDR historians began to deal with the 
Nazi regime in a more empirical and complex fashion during the last decade. 
Somewhat hesitatingly, a few East German scholars took advantage of the 
climate of detente in order to elaborate a richer and more differentiated picture 
of the Third Reich. Their methodological approach started to shift from the 
history of Marxist-Leninist ideas and analysis of class politics to investigations 
of social formations and the scrutiny of everyday lives.31 From the mid-1980s 
on, a careful discussion of “gaps of knowledge” began to pinpoint the short-
comings of the fascism formulas and to argue for a more subtle approach that 
would use Marxist ideology as a generalized perspective rather than as a set of 
authoritative statements about the past. In consequence of such momentum, old 
themes such as the role of the NSDAP were rethought while new topics such as 
the bourgeois opposition or the persecution of Jews became feasible. During 
the last half decade, resistance specialists started to acknowledge “deficits in 
the research of motivations for behavior during the dictatorship in general” and 
demanded a “more and more factual style.”32 In line with greater frankness in 
discussing the holocaust, GDR historians admitted that for racial reasons “no 
group was hit [as] hard as the Jews.”33 Although after 1985 such rethinking 
                                                             
29  See the strictures in Dietrich Orlow, “Neuere Forschungen zur Geschichte des Nationalso-
zialismus im englischen Sprachraum”; William S. Allen, “Voting Behavior and Public Opi-
nion in the Rise, Consolidation and Dynamics of the Nazi Regime, 1930-1939”; and Ja-
rausch, “’Germanizing’ the Professions: Lawyers, Teachers and Engineers, 1933-1939,” all 
presented as papers at the US-GDR Colloquium in November 1987. 
30  See Sybil Milton, “The Context of the Holocaust” German Studies Review 13 (May 1990): 
269-83; and Robert Gellately, “Rethinking the Nazi Terror System: A Historiographical 
Analysis,” ibid. 14 (February 1991): 23-38; as well as the papers by C. Koonz on the 
eugenics struggle and Thomas Childers on propaganda at the 1989 US-GDR Colloquium. 
31  Richter, “On Some Aspects of Recent Historiography,” and Iggers, “Introduction,” passim. 
Cf. also the conference papers of the two meetings for more detailed examples. 
32  Bramke, “Der antifaschistische Widerstand in der Geschichtsschreibung der DDR in den 
achtziger Jahren. Forschungsstand und Probleme,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 28 
(1988): 23ff., is a revealing summary by an innovative scholar. 
33  Pätzold, “Faschistische Gewalt gegen Juden. Thesenhafter Überblick,” in Deutscher Fa-
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created increasing tensions between scholarship and politics, before November 
1989 internal discussions carefully modified rather than challenged the basic 
antifascist consensus.  
In spite of growing sophistication, GDR scholarship was eventually undone 
by its political blinders. According to the Leipzig historian Werner Bramke, 
“research and representation of anti-Fascism always had a special, almost con-
stitutive importance for the historical thinking of the GDR.” The Marxist ap-
proach basically suggested that the East German state was the result of lawlike 
historical development, superceding fascist capitalism by communist socialism. 
Many of the GDR founders were resistance fighters like Erich Honecker, al-
lowing the SED to base its leadership claim on their uncompromising opposi-
tion to the Nazis.34 The formerly bourgeois parties were forced to cooperate in 
the “national front” so as to prevent the resurgence of fascism. At the same 
time, many GDR intellectuals enthusiastically embraced the antifascist credo, 
and their literary popularizations provided a broader humanist legitimacy for 
the embattled regime.35 While its special role guaranteed a wider audience, 
Third Reich historiography nonetheless suffered from the general deformations 
of historical research in East Germany. Strict state supervision not only dictated 
research agendas but explicit and implicit censorship also established limits of 
interpretation. Methodologically, the economic determinism of Marxist ideolo-
gy prescribed an objectivist structuralism that underestimated subjective and 
cultural considerations. Despite much gradual differentiation, such politically 
determined blind spots, uncorrected by historical criticism, hampered not only 
East German scholarship but also the legitimacy of the state.36  
In the conception of “Fascism [a]s a past which never ends,” Soviet consid-
erations played a major part. Due to the heavy Russian losses in the anti-Hitler 
war, textbooks celebrated the role of the Red Army in conquering Berlin and 
liberating Germany with great enthusiasm. Popular monument such as the 
Soviet army museum at the Karlshorst commandantura, where the Wehrmacht 
surrendered, kept this memory alive.37 During the 1950s the history of the 
German labor movement was rewritten in order to celebrate the leading role of 
comrade Stalin – a painful exercise in the country of Marx and Engels which 
was later attenuated but never completely rescinded. Although they knew of its 
existence, GDR scholars could not mention the secret appendix to the Ribben-
trop-Molotov pact when discussing the outbreak of the Second World War, so 
as not to offend the big brother in the East. A combination of victor’s asser-
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tiveness and archival disorganization also made it impossible for East German 
historians to ascertain exactly which documents the Russians had removed in 
1945, or to consult them.38 Ironically, with the arrival of glasnost in 1985, the 
direction of Soviet influence gradually reversed, now actually impelling greater 
candor. In response to threatening disclosures about the Stalinism of the KPD, 
Honecker stopped the publication of the German-language edition of the Rus-
sian journal Sputnik, thereby losing credit with their own intellectuals. While 
fear of the Soviet constraint prevented open discussion for decades, in the end 
Gorbachev’s opening hastened both freer historical discussion and the downfall 
of the SED regime.39  
The long denial of the procedural resemblance between fascist and Stalinist 
repression contributed to the discrediting of the East German state. In May 
1989, apologists still claimed that “the GDR took its stand” on the personality 
cult around Stalin “already some decades ago and condemned these crimes” 
against the German resistance. Though the SED perfunctorily disassociated 
itself from Stalinism in the late 1950s and 1980s, “it has been a long-standing 
practice of the SED, intensified these days, to gloss over the Stalinist past by 
wrapping itself in the banner of its anti-Fascism – all part of the attempt to 
label itself ‘the better Germany.’”40 The gadfly historian Jürgen Kuczynski 
alluded to regrettable excesses in his memoirs during the early 1980s. Half a 
decade later, the former espionage chief Markus Wolf hesitatingly began to 
bring Stalinist skeletons out of the GDR closet. In 1989, Walter Janka, the 
onetime director of the prestigious Aufbau publishing house, still had to pub-
lish the recollections of his five-year Bautzen imprisonment in the West, before 
being legally rehabilitated.41 Even while they began to reject “the insistence on 
theoretical formulas” of party dogma and to discuss such sensitive topics pri-
vately, GDR historians produced no reckoning with communist repression 
comparable to the indictment by Roy Medvedev in the Soviet Union.42 Due to 
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the open debate of Stalin’s crimes, such as the purges in Eastern Europe, the 
double standard of vigorous antifascism and all too timid anti-Stalinism even-
tually created a crisis of historical credibility which contributed to undermining 
the SED regime.43  
The final problem that undercut GDR identity was the unresolved question 
of national unity and the attraction of the Federal Republic. As long as there 
was some hope of unification under communist auspices, East German intellec-
tuals saw themselves as the progressive leaders of a “united fatherland,” in the 
later forbidden words of their anthem. As a consequence of the Cold War, 
emphasis shifted to Abgrenzung, symbolized by the Wall, so as to construct a 
socialist state in the Soviet-controlled remnant of Germany. Contacts between 
GDR and FRG historians were broken off and the tone of exchanges turned 
polemical.44 In the softening climate of Ostpolitik, East German scholars re-
jected Willy Brandt’s adoption of their own formula of “two states and one 
nation” and asserted that the Bismarckian state had disappeared: “Since the late 
40s two independent German states have emerged, the GDR and the FRG, as a 
result of internal historical developments connected to the world-wide conflict 
between socialism and capitalism.” Based on a separate GDR consciousness, 
the formula of “a German nation of socialist character” treated German history 
as a funnel with all prior development leading only to the East German present. 
In spite of rejecting a common heritage, the vague notion of a “community of 
historical responsibility” allowed a resumption of contacts such as the confe-
rences with SPD historians.45 But increasing demands for reunification in the 
mass demonstrations of 1989-90 showed that this rhetorical resolution of the 
national problem no longer convinced the silent majority of the GDR citizens 
longing for prosperity. Though many intellectuals preferred a “third way” 
between East and West, a separate historiography and polity were left behind in 
the rush to German unity.46  
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The dilemma of GDR historiography is suggestively illustrated in the form 
of a novella, called Märkische Forschungen. With fine irony, Günter de Bruyn 
in the mid-1970s constructed a plot around the rediscovery of a Jacobin poet of 
the Mark Brandenburg by a famous literature professor, alluding to the quest 
for a radical pedigree for the GDR. In another work by Max von Schwedenow, 
the interest of a local history buff in the same artist leads to a meeting of minds 
between the well-known scholar and the primary school teacher, with the for-
mer inviting the latter to work at his institute. But when the pedagogue thinks 
he has discovered that their common protagonist did not die in 1813 but rather 
lived on as reactionary bureaucrat after 1814 under the name von Massow, a 
conflict becomes inevitable, since presumed fact clashes with the ideological 
need to create a progressive culture hero. In the decisive meeting, the professor 
mocks the teacher’s discovery as clumsy positivism and “dangerous theses of 
an amateur-historian which he cannot prove.” For the sake of the academic’s 
own book, the awkward findings are barred from print and the radical poet is 
publicly celebrated as “myth of an exemplary heroic life.” When even a con-
servative West German editor refuses publication, the teacher has no alterna-
tive but to return to his village and become a tractor driver, still vainly search-
ing for physical proof of his thesis in the hope that an incontestable fact will 
somehow convince the academic establishment. The lesson, if there is one, is 
devastating: “One should not teach someone criticism who cannot keep silent” 
and “moral victory and suicide are almost synonymous.”47 Deftly told, this tale 
dramatizes the clash between political needs and imperatives of truth, in which 
ideology all too often superceded fact. 
Within communist constraints, the academic achievement of GDR historians 
was remarkable. Aided by the historical bent of Marxist ideology, East German 
scholars rebuilt the institutional structure of research out of the ruins of the 
Third Reich under more trying circumstances than in the West. Through party 
control, they succeeded in training a new generation of antifascist historians, 
firmly anchored in a communist perspective. Often in conscious rejection of 
western examples, they established a fiercely different historical literature 
which stressed the monopoly-capitalist nature of fascism. Helped by planning 
and collective cooperation, this impressive production highlighted some neg-
lected topics of Nazi rule, such as communist resistance, the relations between 
industrialists and party leaders, the role of the Red Army in the defeat of Hitler, 
and the like.48 Somewhat belatedly, East German colleagues began to shift their 
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attention from political and ideological issues to social or cultural questions, 
exploring the everyday lives of the masses and of the middle strata.49 Before 
1989 GDR research had achieved a growing confidence, acknowledged “the 
complexity of the objective historical process,” claimed to be based on “leng-
thy, comprehensive and detailed research,” and invited “scholarly discus-
sion.”50 When using Marxism as a humanist perspective, East German historio-
graphy became capable of dialogue with western scholarship, sometimes 
serving as a valuable corrective.51  
Paradoxically, scholarly progress combined with a failure of political nerve. 
The deafening silence of GDR historians on the dictatorial nature of their own 
regime resulted less from fear than from an inner blockage, based on faith in 
the perfectability of the socialist utopia. For many GDR intellectuals, the strug-
gle against Hitler also created a “terrible predicament” which kept their critique 
in check. Since the founders of the new state were bona fide antifascists, resis-
tance against East German Stalinism “would have meant: resisting the resis-
ters.”52 In three areas did the reluctance to universalize antifascism into a criti-
que of all oppression prove particularly devastating. By pinning the blame on 
monopoly capitalists, the Comintern definition of fascism indirectly absolved 
the majority of the population from confronting its own complicity.53 The eco-
nomic reductionism of attributing Hitler’s power to an expropriated bourgeois 
class did not engage the racial dimension of anti-Semitism and insufficiently 
inoculated youths against xenophobia. By rejecting all similarities between 
fascism and Stalinism, GDR historians failed to address the police-state me-
thods of their own version of Stasinismus as, one November 1989 poster ironi-
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cally pointed out.54 In their lack of civic courage to explore the existing lati-
tude, they were neither better nor worse than the GDR population at large. But 
this conformism had particularly nefarious consequences, since a flawed anti-
fascism was drummed into academics through obligatory Marxist-Leninist 
instruction and inculcated in pupils through the teaching of history.55 
Some remnants of antifascism did accelerate the reorientation of historians 
within the civic revolution of 1989. Inspired by a more genuine anti-Nazi 
commitment, some opposition intellectuals saw themselves as acting in the 
resistance tradition, struggling against both Nazi dictatorship and Stalinist 
repression. “History needs to be thoroughly exposed.”56 In response to public 
pressure, the Institute for History of the Academy of Sciences endorsed “un-
sparing, honest and open research into the complete historical heritage, with all 
its positive and negative accounts” in November 1989. A partial admission of 
failure, this call for eliminating the “blanks pots” in GDR memory authorized a 
broader debate about the “victims of Stalinism,” such as the many German 
communists who perished in the Soviet Union during the 1930s. Similarly, the 
history department of the Wilhelm Pieck University in Rostock in a close vote 
declared that “historical scholarship should no longer be a handmaiden of poli-
tics.” Reflecting the ethical Marxism of many intellectuals, the historiography 
specialist Wolfgang Küttler defined the task of the historian in a mixed fashion 
as “the anti-Fascist struggle, socialist renewal and maintenance of progressive 
historical thinking of the present generation.”57 By March 1990 many admitted 
“that historical scholarship... undoubtedly shares some responsibility for the 
deformation of socialist ideals” and called for “a critical attitude to the past” 
and “methodological pluralism” as the basis for civic emancipation. While 
historians “offered no impulses for change,” the ever more obvious parallel 
between 1945 and 1989 did help initiate a self-critical reflection about the 
discipline’s support of the Honecker regime.58  
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In the transition from an affirmative communist to a critical democratic role, 
the antifascist legacy no longer provided much guidance. Unwilling to give up 
power in institutions and journals, unregenerate communists invoked the resis-
tance experience in order to perpetuate PDS rule with only minimal correc-
tions.59 But Wendehälse suddenly changed with the tide, discovering their 
penchant for German national history and the Prussian tradition from Frederick 
the Great to Bismarck.60 Former victims began to speak out against “the 
speechlessness” of their colleagues, castigating their lack of “civic courage.”61 
Other scholars sincerely struggled to develop their Marxist moorings into a 
democratic socialist perspective, open to methodological innovation.62 Not 
surprisingly, in the meeting of the GDR association of historians, the SED old 
guard refused to give up its power even to PDS progressives and elected a 
former apparatchik as chairman.63 In no uncertain language younger dissidents 
protested against the “stifling of intellectual freedom by an impalatable stew of 
lies and half-truths,” calling for a fundamental renewal. Boldly invoking the 
parallel of the Third Reich, these alternative historians rejected “the instrumen-
talization of history for the sake of securing the rule” of the SED, and in April 
1990 founded an “Independent Association of Historians” in order to overth-
row “the old power structures and mentalities.”64 No wonder that West German 
reactions to their new eastern colleagues ranged from increased cooperation to 
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calls for a purge. The difficulties of this personal, professional, and political 
reorientation are bound to bedevil German historians for years to come.65  
As in earlier incarnations of history as politics, the failure of East German 
antifascism involved multiple ironies. In contrast to western tendencies to 
forget and excuse, the GDR started with a clearer public commitment to anti-
Nazi values and practices. But ritualized hommage to an antifa consensus 
failed to extirpate the roots of fascistoid behavior in the authoritarian collabora-
tion and racism of the majority of the population. The unequivocal partisanship 
of East German scholars provided initial accounts of the Third Reich with a 
didactic power which western mystifications about Germany’s tragic fate 
lacked. But historical writing was slow to emancipate itself somewhat from 
SED dictates and to produce a more complex picture of the multiple ambigui-
ties of the Nazi regime.66 While the technical competence of scholarship im-
proved, its ethical power vanished, because historians did not publicly draw 
upon their critique of the Hitlerian past in order to expose related tendencies in 
a neo-Stalinist present. The “double-drug” of “fear of a hostile environment 
(including its agents in one’s own country) and hope for a coming realm of 
abundance” silenced internal doubts.67 While many scholars were uncomforta-
ble with the lacunae (weisse Flecken) in the GDR’s self-perception, before 
October 1989 historians did not address Stalinism as a structural characteristic 
of their system.68  
Although antifascism was an admirable reaction to the disasters of the Third 
Reich, its SED instrumentalization kept it from fostering a democratic morality 
and an incisive scholarship. Only if generalized against every kind of repres-
sion and prejudice can the anti-Nazi imperative once again become an ethical 
basis of a free civic culture. The loss of intellectual bearings in East Germany 
requires honest reflection about the contribution of scholarship to its deforma-
tion. At stake are both the restoration of democratic politics and “the recovery 
of the dignity of the profession.”69 
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